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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BASICS OF VALUE PLURALISM
The concluding section of Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty helped to
spark what may now be regarded as a full-fledged value-pluralist
movement in contemporary moral philosophy.1 Leading contributors to
this movement include John Gray, Stuart Hampshire, John Kekes,
Charles Larmore, Steven Lukes, Thomas Nagel, Martha Nussbaum,
Joseph Raz, Michael Stocker, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams.2

* Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies and Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution. This article is an adaptation of material originally printed in WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM (2002).
1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
167–72 (1969).
2. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN (1996); STUART HAMPSHIRE, Morality and
Conflict, in MORALITY AND CONFLICT 140 (1983); JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF
PLURALISM (1993); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987);
STEVEN LUKES, Making Sense of Moral Conflict, in MORAL CONFLICT AND POLITICS 3
(1991); THOMAS NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128
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During the past decade, moral philosophers have clarified and debated
many of the complex technical issues raised by value pluralism as well
as broader objections to the overall approach.3 For the purposes of this
essay a few basics will suffice.
(1) Value pluralism is not relativism. The distinction between
good and bad, and between good and evil, is objective and
rationally defensible.
(2) Value pluralists argue that objective goods cannot be fully
rank ordered. This means that there is no common measure
for all goods, which are qualitatively heterogeneous. It means
that there is no single summum bonum that is the chief good
for all individuals. It means that there are no comprehensive
lexical orderings among types of goods. It also means that
there is no “first virtue of social institutions,”4 but rather a
range of public goods and virtues whose relative importance
will depend on circumstances.
(3) Some goods are basic in the sense that they form part of any
choiceworthy conception of a human life. To be deprived of
such goods is to be forced to endure the great evils of
existence. All decent regimes endeavor to minimize the
frequency and scope of such deprivations.
(4) Beyond this parsimonious list of basic goods, there is a wide
range of legitimate diversity—of individual conceptions of
good lives, and also of public cultures and public purposes.
This range of legitimate diversity defines the zone of
individual liberty, and also of deliberation and democratic
decisionmaking. Where necessity, natural or moral, ends,
choice begins.
(5) The denial of value pluralism is some form of what I will call
“monism.” A theory of value is monistic, I will say, if it

(1979); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2001); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
1973–1980, at 71 (1981); Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 129 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
3. See INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997); see also Glen Newey, Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism,
and Neutrality, 45 POL. STUD. 296 (1997); Glen Newey, Value-Pluralism in Contemporary
Liberalism, 37 DIALOGUE: CAN. PHIL. REV. 493 (1998).
4. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) (asserting justice to be “the
first virtue of social institutions”).
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either (a) reduces goods to a common measure or (b) creates
a comprehensive hierarchy or ordering among goods.
One must ask why value pluralism is to be preferred to the various
forms of monism that thinkers have advanced since the beginning of
philosophy as we know it.
To begin, monistic accounts of value lead to Procrustean distortions of
moral argument. The vicissitudes of hedonism and utilitarianism in this
respect are well known. Even Kant could not maintain the position that
the good will is the only good with moral weight, whence his account of
the “highest good,” understood as a heterogeneous composite of inner
worthiness and external good fortune.
Second, our moral experience suggests that the tension among broad
structures or theories of value—consequentialism, deontology, and
virtue theory; general and particular obligations; regard for others and
justified self-regard—is rooted in a genuine heterogeneity of value. If
so, no amount of philosophical argument or cultural progress can lead to
the definitive victory of one account of value over the rest. Moral
reflection is the effort to bring different dimensions of value to bear on
specific occasions of judgment and to determine how they are best
balanced or ordered, given the facts of the case.
Many practitioners, and not a few philosophers, shy away from value
pluralism out of fear that it leads to deliberative anarchy. Experience
suggests that this is not necessarily so. There can be right answers,
widely recognized as such, even in the absence of general rules for
ordering or aggregating diverse goods.
It is true, as John Rawls pointed out more than thirty years ago, that
pluralism on the level of values does not rule out in principle the
existence of general rules for attaching weights to particular values or
for establishing at least a partial ordering among them.5 But in practice
these rules prove vulnerable to counterexamples or extreme situations.
As Brian Barry observes, Rawls’s own effort to establish lexical
priorities among heterogeneous goods does not succeed: “[S]uch a
degree of simplicity is not to be attained. We shall . . . have to accept
the unavoidability of balancing, and we shall also have to accept a
greater variety of principles than Rawls made room for.”6 But, to repeat,
5. Id. at 42.
6. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT: A REISSUE WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION,
at lxxi (Univ. of Cal. Press reissue 1990) (1965). Barry goes on to suggest that
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the moral particularism I am urging is compatible with the existence of
right answers in specific cases; there may be compelling reasons to
conclude that certain trade-offs among competing goods are preferable
to others.
II. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM
Even though value pluralism is not relativism, it certainly embodies
what Thomas Nagel has called the “fragmentation of value.”7 But
political order cannot be maintained without some agreement. It is not
unreasonable to fear that once value pluralism is publicly acknowledged
as legitimate, it may unleash centrifugal forces that make a decently
ordered public life impossible. Within the pluralist framework, how is
the basis for a viable political community to be secured?
In this part, I explore three kinds of responses to this question: the
requirements of public order, the structuring processes of constitutionalism,
and the force of ethical presumptions.
A. The Minimum Conditions of Public Order
Although pluralists cannot regard social peace and stability as
dominant goods in all circumstances, they recognize that these goods
typically help to create the framework within which the attainment of
other goods becomes possible. They recognize, then, that anarchy is the
enemy of pluralism and that political community is, within limits, its
friend. Pluralists must therefore endorse what I shall call the minimum
conditions of public order.
For modern societies, anyway, these conditions form a familiar list.
Among them are clear and stable property relations, the rule of law, a
public authority with the capacity to enforce the law, an economy that
does not divide the population permanently between a thin stratum of the
rich and the numerous poor, and a sense of membership in the political
community strong enough, in most circumstances, to override ethnic and
religious differences.
It follows that pluralists are also committed to what may be called the
conditions of the conditions—those economic and social processes that
experience suggests are needed, at least in modern and modernizing

something like the “original position,” understood as embodying the requirement that valid
principles must be capable of receiving the free assent of all those affected by them,
might nonetheless lead to general principles for balancing competing values. Id. at lxxi–
lxxii.
7. NAGEL, supra note 2, at 128.
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societies, to secure the minimum conditions of public order. Among
these are a suitably regulated market economy, a basic level of social
provision, and a system of education sufficient to promote not only
economic competence but also law abidingness and civic attachment.
I do not mean to suggest that this public framework constitutes an
ensemble of goods and values that always outweighs other goods and
values. Under unusual circumstances, the moral costs of public life may
become too high to be endured, and individuals may feel impelled
toward conscientious objection or outright resistance. Nonetheless,
pluralists will understand that in the vast majority of circumstances,
reliable public order increases rather than undermines the ability of
individuals to live in accordance with their own conceptions of what
gives life meaning and value. This does not mean that each can live out
his conception to the hilt. The ensemble of conditions of public order
will typically require some modification of each individual’s primary
desires. In the absence of public order, however, the threat to those
desires will almost always be much greater. It is rational and reasonable,
therefore, for pluralists to incorporate a shared sense of the minimum
conditions of public order into the ensemble of goods they value and
pursue.
B. Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism offers a second kind of response to the challenge
posed by the centrifugal tendencies of moral pluralism. Beyond the
common foundation and requisites of public order, every political
community assumes a distinctive form and identity through its constitution.
A constitution, we may say, represents an authoritative partial ordering
of public values. It selects a subset of worthy values, brings them to the
foreground, and subordinates others to them. These preferred values
then become the benchmarks for assessing legislation, public policy, and
even the condition of public culture.
Various aspects of this definition require further elaboration.
To begin, within the pluralist understanding, there is no single
constitutional ordering that is rationally preferable to all others—
certainly not across differences of space, time, and culture, and arguably
not even within a given situation. Nonetheless, the worth of a constitution
can be assessed along three dimensions: realism, coherence, and
congruence. A constitution is realistic if the demands it places on
citizens are not too heavy for them to bear. A constitution is coherent if
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the ensemble of values it represents is not too diverse to coexist within
the same community. A constitution is congruent if its broad outlines
correspond to the moral sentiments of the community and to the
situation that community confronts.
Nor, for the pluralist, is there a single account of how a given
constitution comes to be authoritative. One model is covenantal
acceptance: the people of Israel at Sinai. Another is public ratification
of the work of a constitutional convention, as in the United States. A
third is bargaining among representatives of large forces in a divided
society—the process that led to the post-apartheid South African
constitution. A fourth flows from the ability of a great leader to express
the spirit of needs of a people in a practicable manner—the Napoleonic
Code or the French Fifth Republic. It is even possible for a conqueror to
establish an authoritative constitution for a conquered people, as the
Allies did for Germany and the United States for Japan after World War
II.
Authoritativeness, we may say, has two sorts of necessary conditions:
the objective and the subjective. No proposed constitution can become
authoritative if it falls below the minimum requirements of realism,
coherence, and congruence. Nor can it be authoritative if it fails to gain
broad acceptance within the community—perhaps not immediately, but
within a reasonable period of time. Although the post-World War II
German constitution met this condition, it seems clear in retrospect that
the post-World War I Weimar Republic never did.
A constitution represents only a “partial ordering” of value in three
senses. In the first place, there is no guarantee that a community’s
distinctive constitutional values will always be consistent with the
minimum requirements of public order, or that in cases of conflict public
order must yield to constitutional values. Second, it is not the case that
constitutional values will always dominate an individual’s ensemble of
personal values. There are circumstances in which it is not unreasonable
for individuals to place the values at the core of their identities above the
requirements of citizenship.
Third, a constitution is only a partial ordering because the plurality of
values that it establishes as preferred will unavoidably come into conflict
with one another. Such conflicts are a familiar feature of U.S.
constitutionalism. Public purposes understood in the consequentialist
manner (domestic tranquility) may clash with individual rights understood
deontologically (a fair trial). And individual rights may themselves
come into conflict; consider the tension between the right to a fair trial
and the freedom of the press.
From a pluralist standpoint, it is inevitable that many of these conflicts
will have no single rationally compelling solution. Reasonable men and

808

GALSTON FINAL ARTICLE

[VOL. 46: 803, 2009]

12/28/2009 10:47 AM

What Value Pluralism Means
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

women may well disagree about the relative weight to be attached to
competing values, and many will be able to make legitimate appeal to
different features of the constitutional framework. There are no strict
lexical orderings, even in theory, among basic values.
In Federalist No. 51, James Madison poses a famous rhetorical
question: “[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature?”8 And he continues: “If men were angels, no government
would be necessary.”9 A philosophical pluralist must disagree. Even if
every individual were in Madison’s sense angelic—perfectly capable of
subordinating ambition and self-interest to reason and public spirit—
nonetheless the incapacity of human reason to resolve fully clashes
among worthy values means that authoritative mechanisms for resolving
disputes remain indispensable. The more reasonable individuals are, the
more clearly they will understand the need for such mechanisms. And
this is true even if there is broad public consensus on constitutional
matters—on the ensemble of values that are to be brought into the
foreground.
From a pluralist standpoint, individuals vested with the power to make
authoritative decisions—whether judicial, legislative, or executive—
must understand that many of the controversies they are called on to
resolve represent the clash, not of good and bad, but rather of good and
good. This means that these individuals must carry out their duties in a
particular spirit: to the maximum extent feasible, their decisions should
reflect what is valuable, not only to the winners, but also to the losers.
Sometimes this will not be possible. But when not required by the logic
of the matter to be resolved, winner-take-all decisions needlessly, and
therefore wrongfully, diverge from the balance of underlying values at
stake.
C. Ethical Presumption
The third way in which the centrifugal tendencies of moral pluralism
are moderated is through a structure of relationships among values that I
shall call ethical presumption. To understand the nature of presumption, we
must start further back.
More than three decades ago, the noted student of jurisprudence
Chaim Perelman observed that few philosophers have explored
8.
9.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
Id.
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analogies between philosophy and law. Starting with Plato, many have
suggested parallels between philosophy and mathematics.
More
recently, others have tried to refashion philosophy along the lines of
natural science. But important structural similarities between philosophy
and law have been neglected, Perelman suggests.10
In law, reasonable and honest people can reach differing conclusions,
unlike mathematics, such that additional evidence cannot suffice to
overcome their differences, unlike the sciences. The ubiquity of
reasonable disagreement in the law suggests a conception of rational
decision that is neither determined by truth nor driven by arbitrary will,
and it makes necessary structures of decision that can give authoritative
force to one reasonable view over others. Indeed, Perelman argues, the
very coherence of the idea of authority rests on this conception of
decisions that are consistent with but not required by reason.11 Authority
is superfluous, or at best derivative, in spheres in which reason compels
a unique result.12
Perelman’s account of reasonable disagreement is more than a little
reminiscent of Aristotle’s discussion of deliberation. Aristotle begins,
and proceeds, by enumerating the matters about which we do not
deliberate: mathematical truths, law-governed regularities of nature,
matters of chance, or particular facts, among others. Instead, we
deliberate about matters of human agency in which actions do not
generate fully predictable results, matters in which though subject to
rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue.13 So
deliberation is the effort to choose the best course, all things considered,
in circumstances in which reason shapes but does not fully determine
that course.
Perelman takes Aristotle’s argument one important step further. The
nature of law, and of practical deliberation more generally, points toward
the necessary ground of human freedom:

10. See CH. PERELMAN, What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law,
in JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 163
(1980).
11. Id. at 163–66.
12. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 43–44 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000). For an outstanding discussion of Aristotelian deliberation influenced
by value pluralism, see D. Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL
REASONING 144 (Joseph Raz ed., 1978).
13. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 43.
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Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor
arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable
choice can be exercised. If freedom was no more than necessary adherence to a
previously given natural order, it would exclude all possibility of choice; and if
the exercise of freedom were not based on reasons, every choice would be
irrational and would be reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an
intellectual void.14

In short, neither Spinoza’s determinism nor Sartre’s decisionism can
explain human freedom as we experience and practice it. Freedom
operates in a zone of partial but not complete regularity, a discursive
arena in which some reasons are better than others but none is clearly
dominant over all of the rest in every situation. If ethics and politics are
part of this zone, as they evidently are, then their substance will reflect
this ceaseless interplay of strong but not compelling reasons grappling
with the variability of practical circumstances.
Perelman observes that every system of law embodies a presumption
in favor of past decisions. The new and the old do not have to be treated
in the same fashion; law teaches us to abandon existing rules only if
good reasons justify their replacement. This presumption is not absolute,
but the burden of proof falls on those advocating change.15 In a similar
spirit, the nineteenth-century scholar Richard Whately, one of the
founders of the modern study of argumentation, contended that although
the majority of existing institutions and practices are susceptible of
improvement, “the ‘Burden of Proof’ lies with him who proposes an
alteration; simply, on the ground that since a change is not a good in
itself, he who demands a change should show cause for it.”16
The reasoning underlying this stance is straightforward. The merits
and defects of the status quo are well known. Unless the status quo is so
intolerable that any change would be for the better, or at least not for the
worse, then there is a possibility that a proposed change could produce a
state of affairs that is even less desirable than the admittedly defective
status quo. That is why the burden of proof is on the advocate of change
to show why the proposed reform is unlikely to make matters worse, all
things considered, and that those at greatest risk of harm are situated
14. CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION 514 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame
Press 1969) (1958); see also PERELMAN, supra note 10, at 169–70.
15. PERELMAN, supra note 10, at 170.
16. RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC 91 (Scholars’ Facsimiles &
Reprints 1991) (1846); see also DOUGLAS WALTON, ARGUMENTS FROM IGNORANCE 214–
17 (1996) (discussing this point).
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well enough to take a hit without suffering a devastating loss that no one
would reasonably accept.
The phenomenon of legal presumption has a broader philosophical
implication, Perelman suggests. Specifically, the Cartesian prescription
for universal doubt makes no sense:
What normal man would put any of his convictions into doubt if the reasons for
doubt were not more solid than the opinion to which they were opposed? To
shake a belief there is need, as with a lever, for a point of leverage more solid
than what is to be moved. . . . One could formulate the principle of inertia as a
directive: One should not change anything without reason. If one maintains that
our ideas, our rules, and our behavior are devoid of an absolute foundation, and
that for this reason, the pros and cons are equally worthy, and that one must
therefore in philosophy make a tabula rasa of our past, one expresses an exigency
that comes from utopia and to which one can only conform fictitiously.17

Whether or not universal doubt is a feasible strategy for theoretical
philosophy, many follow Perelman in arguing that it is not. It is notable
that Descartes does not extend it, or the quest for certainty, to practical
life. In Perelman’s formulation, he distinguishes between “our ideas”
and “our behavior.”18 This suggests an important distinction between
theoretical and practical reflection. The decision to accept no merely
probable metaphysical or scientific proposition as true may leave the
mind suspended in a state of permanent agnosticism. The consequences
for practice are very different: the decision to accept no merely probable
moral or political proposition as valid calls the status quo into question
without being able to put anything in its place. But practical life does
not wait for ethics and political philosophy to arrive at certainty.
Decisions must be made, here and now, on the basis of limited—or
complex and confusing—evidence and argument. The practical analogue
of theoretical agnosticism, namely indecision that leads to inaction, is
itself a decision that affects, and usually but not always sustains, the
status quo.19 Although the presumption in favor of the status quo may
appear conservative, the willingness to make practical decisions on
grounds well short of certainty opens the door to changes that a more
stringent standard would rule out.
The reasons advanced to justify decisions typically include general
maxims tacitly, or less frequently explicitly, derived from moral or
political theory. The absence of certainty is not confined to the empirical
dimensions of decisionmaking but reflects its normative dimensions as
well. In this respect, among others, Perelman’s suggestion that philosophy
could fruitfully take its bearings from law seems plausible, at least for
17.
18.
19.
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practical philosophy. This is why moral and political philosophy may
have something to learn from the role presumptions play in jurisprudence.
In an important article, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III elaborates the
conception of presumption in a legal context. As a backdrop, he
sketches two opposed pure notions of judging: strict adherence to rules,
without exception; and equity-based jurisprudence that takes its bearings
from the facts of each case.20 The problem with strict rules is that they
will inevitably run up against exceptional cases in which their application
will appear harsh and unreasonable. The problem with unfettered equity
is that it provides little predictability or uniformity, diluting the principal
advantages of the rule of law.21 For purposes of this discussion, I will
follow Wilkinson in presupposing that the result or meaning of applying
rules to particular cases is not in doubt. The frequent uncertainty of
interpreting rules raises other questions that I want to set aside for now.
Against this backdrop, the jurisprudence of presumptions emerges as
an attempt to combine the advantages of rules—clarity, predictability,
uniformity—with those of flexibility, prudence, and common sense. The
strength of a legal presumption, Wilkinson declares, lies in its rootedness
in the rule of law; its vulnerability lies in the inability of the drafter of
any legal rule to anticipate all of the factual circumstances to which it
may be applicable.22
In a famous discussion, Aristotle suggests that this combination of
strength and vulnerability is inherent in the nature of law and lawmaking
itself:
The reason is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which
one cannot speak correctly in universal terms. In those areas, then, in which it
is necessary to make universal statements but not possible to do so correctly, the
law takes account of what happens more often, though it is not unaware that it
can be in error. And it is no less correct for doing this; for the error is
attributable not to the law, nor to the law-giver, but to the nature of the case,
since the subject-matter of action is like this in its essence.
So when law speaks universally, and a particular case arises as an exception
to the universal rule, then it is right—where the law-giver fails us and has made
an error by speaking without qualification—to correct the omission. This will
be by saying what the lawgiver would himself have said had he been present,
and would have included within the law had he known.23

20. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 907 (1992).
21. Id. at 908–10.
22. Id. at 908.
23. ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 100.
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Because the tension between generality and particularity is inherent
in the nature of law, there are, Wilkinson suggests, no exceptionless
absolute principles in law.24 Those that may appear absolute are in fact
strong presumptions that may be overcome in specific circumstances.
Not that rebutting a strong presumption is easy: one may understand it as
a well-defended fortress that would require a powerful assault to
conquer. Some presumptions are stronger than others. In American
constitutional law, the presumption in favor of free political speech can
be overcome only by the most compelling public interest; in criminal
cases, the presumption of innocence can be overcome only by evidence
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a difficult standard to meet. The
burden of proof in civil cases is less stringent—the preponderance of the
evidence is required to sustain the plaintiff’s claim.
In part, the variation among standards governing the burden of proof
in different categories of cases reflects differences among the goods and
values at stake. In criminal cases, for example, individuals’ lives and
liberty are at stake. The prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is designed to minimize the chances that individuals
will be wrongfully deprived of these very great goods, which enjoy the
status of natural as well as civil rights in American civic philosophy.
The system cannot wholly eliminate the possibility of such wrongful
deprivation, however. The only way to do so is never to convict anyone
of a felony, which would deprive the entire society of the advantages of
the rule of law. In a universe of plural and competing goods, highly
demanding protections for accused persons may impose excessive costs
along other key dimensions of public value.
We can go further, Wilkinson suggests, towards a precise account of
how the jurisprudence of presumptions operates in practice. First, the
adjudicator must identify the relevant rule of law. Second, the
“presumptive strength” of that rule must be identified. As we have seen,
some rules enjoy a preferred position in our constitutional system, while
others are secondary or tertiary. Third, the adjudicator must assess the
“degree of stress” that an unforeseen circumstance imposes on that rule.
In the case of political speech, for example, not only must the
countervailing state interest be powerful as a matter of principle, but the
facts of the particular case must clearly bring that interest into play.
Fourth, the adjudicator must specify, so far as possible, the costs of
departing from the rule laid down, including not only the costs in the
particular case but the longer term damage to the credibility of the rule

24.
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itself. Finally, the decisionmaker must explain why the result achieved
by making an exception to the rule is preferable to following the rule.25
I want to underscore two features of this schema. First, it does not
identify some neutral point of equipoise between the jurisprudence of
rules and the jurisprudence of equity. Legal rules enjoy a status very
different from that of, say, propositions advanced in a dialogue. If laid
down by those duly empowered to create them, the rules have presumptive
authority flowing from their source. There is a presumption, stronger in
some cases than others, but always powerful, in favor of applying the
rules laid down. The burden of proof lies on those who would relax the
rules or carve out exceptions to them. In these circumstances, it would
not suffice to show that making an accommodation would yield an
outcome just as good, all things considered, as following the rule. A
preponderance of considerations must point toward the exception being
sought. Just how strong a preponderance will depend on the nature of
the rule in question.
Second, the process of justifying the exception often takes place in a
context of multiple values. The rule in question, let us say, seeks to
promote a particular public value. The case for granting an exception
will typically appeal to a different value: if allowed to operate without
modification in pursuit of its intended value, it may be alleged, the rule
will exact too high a price as measured along another important
dimension of value that the system of law cannot reasonably ignore.
I began this discussion of legal presumptions with Perelman’s suggestion
that philosophy should take its bearings from law and jurisprudence. I
now want to apply this suggestion to the special case of practical, that is,
moral and political, philosophy. My hypothesis is this: like legal rules,
moral and political principles act as rebuttable presumptions. The more
entrenched the principle, the more central it is to our understanding, the
weightier the considerations that will be needed to override it. But no
principle is absolute, that is, exceptionless.26
Two examples from applied ethics will clarify this conjecture.
Sissela Bok’s analysis of lying takes its bearings from a “presumption
against lying”—the premise that

25. Id. at 914.
26. For a clear discussion of the comparative strength of arguments, see JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 25–28 (1975). See also PERELMAN & OLBRECHTSTYTECA, supra note 14, 465–71.
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[T]ruthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence of special considerations.
This premise gives an initial negative weight to lies. It holds that they are not
neutral from the point of view of our choices; that lying requires explanation,
whereas truth ordinarily does not.27

Bok explores, but ultimately rejects, the thesis that one should never lie;
in certain extreme but hardly unknown situations, the consequences of
truth telling are simply unacceptable. The inquiry then turns to the
nature of valid excuses—considerations of value sufficient to rebut the
presumption against lying. Grotius offers one important argument—that
in some circumstances an agent bent on doing evil forfeits his right to
truth. For example, you are not morally obligated to tell the truth when
the secret police of a tyrannical regime ask whether you are harboring
refugees from persecution.28 Another important suggestion is that in
circumstances in which it is justified to use force in self-defense or to
protect innocent third parties, it would also be acceptable to use forms of
deceit, including lies.29 There are several other categories of excuses
that are potentially valid in specific circumstances. Nonetheless, the
presumption in favor of truth telling remains powerful, and the grounds
for rebutting that presumption remain stringent.
Michael Walzer’s exploration of just and unjust wars deploys the
classic distinction between the justice of war—the valid or invalid
reasons for which wars are fought, and the justice in war—the
permissible or forbidden means by which wars are conducted. Justice in
war is delimited by what Walzer calls the war convention. At the heart
of that convention is a sharp distinction between combatants and
noncombatants. The latter are “men and women with rights [who]
cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate
purpose.”30 Even just wars must be fought justly; the ends of wars do
not suffice to justify the means of war.
Or do they? In the end, Walzer cannot quite defend the thesis that the
rights of noncombatants are inviolate, regardless of the circumstances.
Although he resists utilitarianism, theories of proportionality, and even
sliding scale justifications of means relative to the justice of ends as
insufficiently stringent, the weight of human experience moves him to
offer instead a thesis that falls just short of absolutism: instead of fiat
justicia ruat coelum, act justly unless the heavens are really about to
fall.31 The war convention is overridden in cases of “imminent catastrophe”

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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or supreme emergency—credible threats to the very existence of a nation
or a people, or the likely victory of a murderous tyranny.32
From this perspective, had the terror bombing of German cities during
World War II been absolutely necessary to defeat Hitler, it would have
been justified. Similarly, if the Israelis were faced with imminent defeat
and probable genocide at the hands of Arab military forces, they would
be justified in using atomic weapons against Damascus and Baghdad if
there were no other way of averting catastrophe. Rights have great
moral weight, but they do not function as trumps in every shuffle of the
deck. Rights have enormous value, but they are not the only things of
value in our moral universe.
The maxim that practical principles function as powerful but
rebuttable presumptions applies to two arenas that are important for our
purposes. The first may be called ordinary universal morality—the
principles of conduct that are embedded in different forms in the world’s
great religions and in the normal social practices of humankind.
Strictures against lying, theft, murder, sexual anarchy, and the oppression of
the weak, among many others, constitute this realm.
The maxim of practical principles as presumptions also applies, less
obviously, to the arena of public culture, by which I mean the ensemble
of practical principles that gives to each political community its distinct
identity. In the case of the United States, for example, a kind of social
egalitarianism, libertarianism, commitment to equal opportunity and
personal responsibility, and mistrust of authority, including governmental
authority, help to define a public culture that differs from that of other
democratic nations. The wind is in the sails of those who deploy these
principles in defense of specific public policy proposals. By contrast,
those who employ opposed principles, say sociological determinism
rather than personal responsibility, bear a heavy burden of proof.
I do not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that principles of
public culture are immune to skeptical questioning. On the contrary,
skeptics have a number of dialectical tools ready at hand. The skeptic
may suggest, first, that there are cases in which it makes no sense to
apply the dominant principles. For example, do we really want to
attribute personal responsibility to someone laboring under a severe
cognitive distortion? Second, the skeptic may suggest that the public
culture is incoherent, that some of its principles contradict others when
32.

Id. at 232.
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applied to particular cases, and that in regarding such cases we have no
choice but to think for ourselves. Third, the skeptic may suggest that the
strict application of a particular principle will lead to results that a
morally decent person of common sense would find hard to accept. This
possibility reflects the fact that a particular public culture always
functions in relation to, and sometimes stands in tension with, the
background code of universal ordinary morality.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me now return to my point of departure. It is not unreasonable to
fear that pluralism’s dispersion of value makes the maintenance of
political community difficult at best. In response, I have explored three
sources of commonality that are consistent with pluralism: the minimum
demands of public order, constitutionalism understood as the selection of
preferred goods and values, and the ethical presumptions of both
universal ordinary morality and of specific public cultures. Taken
together, these sources ask each individual to consider what it means to
be a member of the human species, to be an individual whose conception
of a good and valuable life can only be realized within the framework of
public order, and to be a social being embedded in, though not determined
by, a specific constitution and public culture. The political meaning of
moral pluralism emerges in the unending dialogue between the
differentiating force of individuality and the organizing tendencies of
commonality.
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